Little attention has been given to the manner in which employers might use voluntary social insurance contributions as a labour retention strategy. Using data from Shanghai's zhenbao (town insurance) program as at the end of 2004, the authors examine factors which predict which employees receive voluntary social insurance contributions. The hypothesis tested is that employees with characteristics that make them more influential constituencies will be more likely to receive voluntary social insurance contributions. The findings suggest that formal education and the social insurance status of the employee prior to joining the township insurance program are the most important determinants of which employees receive voluntary employer funded social insurance.
INTRODUCTION
In recent times, human resources management (HRM) strategists have turned their attention to the consideration of devices to attract and retain workers who are valued by a firm. The hiring and retention of valued and talented staff as HRM strategies have achieved prominence in the literature because they provide means though which firms can enhance their competitiveness and improve efficiency within the context of an increasingly competitive and uncertain business environment. One focus of HRM strategists has been on designing monetary compensation and other organizational rewards that can be used to attract, retain and motivate employees to realize organizational goals. However, with few exceptions little attention has been given to the social protection aspects of HRM. Furthermore, there has been virtually no research on the more specific issue of how employer contributions to social insurance might be used as a tool to attract or retain employees. As Zhu and Nyland (2004: 854) put it: "This is because the manner by which social protection legislation impacts on management behaviour and style is not a topic central to HRM studies. …. [There is] a tendency for HR scholars to consider social protection an area of working life of marginal significance to managers, despite the fact that the funding of this aspect of employment is a very significant cost that firms and individuals in all industrialized nations must meet". 1 The aim of this paper is to examine the factors that influence the extent to which firms use voluntary social insurance contributions to retain staff. To realize our objective, the paper draws on a unique dataset from Shanghai containing information on 103,095 employees in the city's zhenbao (town insurance) program, which is colloquially known as the 25 plus X scheme. The data on the 103,095 individuals, which was obtained from the Shanghai Bureau of Labor and Social Security (BOLSS), represents the entire population enrolled in the 25 plus X scheme in one district of Shanghai at the end of 2004. The 25 plus X scheme provides a useful means to examine the extent to which employers choose to make voluntary contributions to social insurance because it both requires a compulsory employer contribution and contains provision for a voluntary employer contribution to commercial pension insurance. In this study we consider the number of employees enrolled in the 25 plus X scheme in this one district of Shanghai who receive employer contributed commercial pension insurance and determine the degree to which the decision of employers in the district to fund employee's commercial pension insurance depends on whether the employee has characteristics that enhance the human resources base of the firm. Specifically, we hypothesize, within the framework proposed by Goodstein (1994) , that employees with characteristics that make them more influential constituencies will be more likely to receive voluntary social insurance contributions. We use the analysis of the quantitative data on the 25 plus X scheme to draw informed conclusions on the broader issue of the extent to which firms in Shanghai use commercial pension insurance as a tool to retain valuable employees.
GLOBAL AND FIRM LEVEL PERSPECTIVES ON EMPLOYERS AND SOCIAL PROTECTION
There is increasing recognition that globalization is a double-edged sword from which there are winners and losers. While the process of marketization and integration into the global economy has overall had a positive effect on the living standards of the urban population in China, it is important to protect those who have lost from the reforms (Nielsen et al., 2005a) . In other words, the market reforms in China have generated a classic example of the Polanyian notion of the double movement of market economies (Zhu & Nyland, 2004) . Social protection is needed to assist workers in both the state and non-state sector to take advantage of the increased opportunities afforded by the marketization process, and, at the same time, handle the associated added insecurities. On the plus side, market reforms have created increased opportunities to work in enterprises with diverse ownership forms. However, on the downside, there are also added insecurities in the form of retrenchment and potentially prolonged unemployment. More than 25 million workers were made redundant from state-owned enterprises between 1996 and 1999 (Appleton et al., 2002) . The burden of retrenchment has fallen most heavily on the disadvantaged. For example, Appleton et al. (2002) found that the risk of retrenchment has been higher for females, the less educated, the low skilled and the middle-aged; precisely those who find it most difficult to find re-employment. However, at the firm level an often voiced complaint from employers is that they cannot 'afford' the cost of mandated employer contributions to social insurance. One would expect that such complaints would apply a fortiori to voluntary employer contributions to commercial pension insurance over and above that mandated by the state. Employer concerns are couched in terms of rising labor costs threatening China's status as the world's factory. Traditionally labor costs in China have been extremely low, reflecting a ready supply of migrant labor ready to work for low wages. But, since 2004 this situation has changed with a shortage of migrant workers emerging in several of the coastal provinces. According to official government estimates, in 2005 factories in Guangdong were short more than 500,000 workers; factories in Fujian were short 300,000 workers and factories in Zhejiang were short 200,000-300,000 workers (Barboza, 2006) . The shortage of workers has put upward pressure on wages. Between April 2004 and April 2006 minimum wages increased 25 per cent in large cities such as Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen (Barboza, 2006) . In September 2006 minimum wages were further increased in Guangdong, Liaoning, Shanghai and Zhejiang in a bid to ease the labor shortage problem. 2 The labor shortage is particularly severe for skilled workers. Media reports have indicated that "skilled workers and technicians are taking advantage of acute shortages to demand double-digit salary increases" (Fuller, 2005) .
As one component of labor costs in China, non-salary costs to firms including mandated social insurance contributions are particularly onerous relative to other Asia-Pacific countries. In many cities in China non-salary costs to employers are equivalent to 40-50 per cent of an employee's salary. This figure compares with 16 per cent in India, 12 per cent in Malaysia, 10-15 per cent in Indonesia and 20 per cent in developed countries such as Australia (Fuller, 2005) A particular problem in the Chinese context is that while the state prescribes minimum social insurance payments required from firms, there is a weak surveillance and enforcement mechanism that means compliance rates are extremely low. Nyland et al. (2006) reported that in 2001 71 per cent of firms audited by the BOLSS in Shanghai paid less than the prescribed social insurance and that in 2002 the comparable figure was 81 per cent. Monitoring and enforcement of firm compliance with social insurance obligations in Shanghai is weak in part because the municipal government is concerned about losing investment to surrounding provinces such as Jiangsu and Zhejiang where employer contributions to social insurance are lower. In discussions with managers in Shanghai an often expressed view is that Shanghai is losing investment to Kunshan Economic and Technical Development Zone, located in Jiangsu about 70 kilometers from Shanghai. This is occurring because the social insurance contributions employers are required to make in Kunshan are lower than in Shanghai, while Kunshan is still close enough to Shanghai for firms to take advantage of Shanghai's infrastructure.
There is evidence that elsewhere in China governments are turning a blind eye to employers' failure to meet social insurance obligations and indeed even using this as a means to lure investors. For example, some local governments in Guangdong have declared that foreigninvested enterprises do not have to participate in social insurance in order to entice foreign investment (Bhattacharya et al., 2005) . These sorts of measures reflect the fact that municipal authorities are particularly concerned about losing foreign direct investment in the face of raising labor costs to other locations in China and offshore to other low labor cost countries in Asia, such as India and Vietnam. Multinationals such as General Motors, Honda, Intel and Motorola have already shifted manufacturing operations to the central and western provinces of China to take advantage of lower labor costs. 3 A number of news reports have appeared in the international media in 2005 and 2006 where multinational companies have either relocated, or signaled an intention to relocate to elsewhere in Asia (see eg. Dougherty, 2006; Fuller, 2005) .
The traditional position that employers cannot afford to contribute to social insurance and that business opposes the expansion of social insurance has been challenged on two fronts. One challenge focuses on what employers need to do to get employees to invest in firm-specific skills. The resource-based literature has stressed that firms should encourage investment in firm-specific human capital because it reduces the threat of poaching (Coff, 1997) . Societal corporatist accounts of the development of modern institutions of social protection proffer that it is perfectly rational for a profit maximizing firm to contribute to social insurance for its employees in these circumstances because this encourages its employees to invest in non-transferable firm-specific skills, which could be rendered obsolete by technological shocks (see eg. Estevez-Abe et al., 2001; Mares, 2001 Mares, , 2003 . As Estevez-Abe et al. (2001: 181) described it:
"If firms want to be competitive in product markets that require an abundance of specific skills, workers must be willing to acquire these skills at the cost of increasing their dependence on a particular employer or group of employers. Because investment in these specific skills increases workers' exposure to risks, only by insuring against such risks can firms satisfy their need for specific skills".
A second challenge to the claim of employers that they cannot afford to contribute to social insurance comes from the economic argument that firms only nominally pay for employer-funded social insurance anyway, while the actual costs are borne by employees in the form of lower wages. Summers (1989) shows how theoretically mandated employer social insurance contributions cause shifts in the demand and supply curve of labor, leading to a lower equilibrium wage that absorbs most, if not all, of the employer social insurance contribution. While there are no studies that have employed Chinese data, empirical studies for other countries have found that employees bear at least some of the burden of employers' contribution to social insurance (Anderson & Meyer, 2000; Gruber, 1997; Gruber & Krueger, 1991; Holmlund, 1983; Ooghe et al., 2003) .
SOCIAL INSURANCE SCHEMES IN 'GREATER SHANGHAI'
In Shanghai there are three main social insurance schemes, which provide social protection for industrial injury, maternity leave, old age, sickness and unemployment to different segments of the workforce. The three schemes are the urban insurance scheme, rural social security scheme and the township insurance (25 plus X) scheme. The scheme in which one is enrolled depends on whether one lives in Shanghai proper or in the outer areas surrounding Shanghai and the type of organization for which one works. The level of contribution required from employers and employees as well as the level of coverage and entitlements provided to employees differs across the three schemes.
The urban insurance scheme was introduced in 1986 and provides comprehensive coverage to all employees working in any firm registered in Shanghai proper as well as employees with an urban registration working in government firms registered in the outer areas surrounding Shanghai proper. In addition, prior to the introduction of the 25 plus X scheme many non-state employers in the outer areas surrounding Shanghai also voluntarily offered their workforce the option of participating in the urban insurance scheme as part of a HRM strategy designed to attract and retain good staff. Under the urban insurance scheme, the Shanghai municipal government stipulates that employers must contribute 37 per cent of payroll and employees contribute 11 per cent of their salary. If the average wage in the firm is less than 60 per cent of the average wage in Shanghai, the firm's social insurance obligations are set equal to 60 per cent of the average wage in the city. If average wages in the firm are greater than three times the average city wage, the firm's social insurance obligations are capped at three times the average. As of June 2005, there were 7.2 million people enrolled in Shanghai's urban insurance scheme, with 2.7 million retirees receiving pensions under the scheme. 4 The rural social security scheme was introduced in 1987 and provides employees enrolled in the scheme with a monthly aged pension on retirement at the eligible age (60 for males and 55 for females). The rural social security scheme applies to firms registered in the outer areas surrounding Shanghai. The Shanghai municipal government stipulates that the enterprise has to contribute to a rural social security fund an amount equal to 15 per cent of the average income per capita in the town in which it is registered multiplied by the number of employees, while employees contribute 5% of the average income per capita in the town. As of June 2005, the number of employees enrolled in the rural social security scheme was 1.3 million, of which 310,000 were receiving an old-age pension.
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The 25 plus X scheme was introduced by the Shanghai municipal government in 2003 with the objective of extending social insurance coverage for Shanghai's workers from the city proper which is covered by the city's urban insurance scheme to the outer areas surrounding Shanghai where previously large numbers had either no coverage at all or the limited coverage provided by the rural social security scheme. While the ostensible objective of the scheme is to increase coverage for those who previously only had rural social security or no coverage at all, some employers who had voluntarily provided their employees with the option of coverage under the urban social insurance scheme prior to the introduction of 25 plus X have withdrawn that offer and are now providing coverage under the 25 plus X scheme in lieu. Under the 25 plus X scheme, employers contribute the 25 per cent base amount (17 per cent for pension insurance, 2 per cent for unemployment insurance, 5 per cent for medical insurance and 0.5 per cent for each of maternity and industrial injury insurance), which is levied on 60 per cent of the average wage in the city. A high proportion of those who are participating in the 25 plus X scheme are, in the parlance of the BOLSS, farmers who are considered to have forfeited their land rights in exchange for participation in the scheme. For these individuals, employers are required to provide the 25 per cent base amount in the form of a 15-year lump sum contribution that is placed in an account managed by the BOLSS. 6 The 25 per cent base amount is guaranteed for these individuals for 15 years irrespective of whether they change jobs. These individuals also receive an urban hukou (household registration) which gives them the option of working for an enterprise registered in an urban area of Shanghai, including central Shanghai. The X component consists of three parts; namely, X1 for commercial pension insurance, X2 for medical insurance and X3 which is a compensation payment for farmers who have forfeited their land rights. In the district in which the data for this study came X2 was 3 per cent of payroll and X3 was 290 RMB per month in 2004, which is paid for a period of 24 months.
7 Under the 25 plus X scheme, employees are not required to make any contribution, unless a minimum contribution is specified by the local town council, primarily for medical treatment.
The compulsory employer contributions under the 25 plus X scheme are the 25 per cent base amount and the X2 and X3 components, with only those firms that have appropriated land as part of Shanghai's urban expansion being required to pay the X3 component. The voluntary contribution is the X1 component which takes the form of employer funded commercial pension insurance. Whether the firm pays the X1 component for any specific employee and the magnitude of the amount paid is left to individual bargaining between employer and employee. However, the BOLSS encourages employers to contribute to X1 through the use of tax incentives, which is attractive to some firms given that the corporate tax rate in Shanghai is 33 per cent. The first 23 per cent of payroll contributed by employers to X1 is tax free, being the difference between the 25 per cent base rate and the 48 per cent combined contribution rate under the urban model (37 per cent of payroll contributed by employers and 11 per cent of wages contributed by employees). Thus, it is the X1 component that gives firms flexibility to top up the social insurance of employees which the firm wishes to attract or retain as a HRM strategy. As of June 2005, the number of employees enrolled in the 25 plus X scheme was 880,000, with 20,000 receiving an old-age pension.
WHAT PREDICTS WHETHER EMPLOYERS VOLUNTARILY CONTRIBUTE TO SOCIAL INSURANCE?

Overview of the District
The district in which the data on the 103,095 employees enrolled in the 25 plus X scheme comes is 40 kilometers from downtown Shanghai. At the end of June 2005, the district had a total population close to one million; of which 36 per cent had an urban hukou, 16.5 per cent had a rural hukou and the remaining 47.5 per cent were migrants from other parts of China. In 2000 there were 267,000 'local employees' (excluding migrants) working in the district; of which 51 per cent were enrolled un the urban insurance scheme and 49 per cent were either covered by the rural social security scheme or had no coverage at all. However, by the end of 2004, just over one year after the introduction of the 25 plus X model, there were 350,000 local employees working in the district; of which 35 per cent had urban insurance, 30 per cent had either rural insurance or nothing and 30 per cent had joined the 25 plus X scheme. The remaining 5 per cent of employees were in a transition phase between the rural insurance scheme and joining the 25 plus X scheme. Figure 1 shows the social insurance status of the 103,095 employees enrolled in the 25 plus X scheme in the district prior to the establishment of the scheme in 2003. Of the 103,095 individuals, 60,255 (41.6 per cent) had previously been insured under the rural social security scheme or had no coverage at all and 42,840 (58.4 per cent) had previously been insured under the urban scheme. Of the total number of employees covered under the 25 plus X scheme in the district, 98,103 (95.16%) were farmers who had exchanged land rights for participation in the 25 plus X scheme. Each of the 60,255 who had previously been insured under the rural social security scheme or had no coverage at all were farmers who had exchanged their land rights, while 37,848 of those who had previously been covered by the urban insurance scheme fell into this category. The remaining 4,992 individuals had previously been covered by the urban insurance scheme, but were not farmers who had exchanged land for participation in the scheme.
Previous Social Insurance Position of the Sample
Characteristics of the Sample
The characteristics of the 103,095 employees participating in the 25 plus X scheme in the one district are provided in Table 1 . The average age of those enrolled in the 25 plus X scheme in the district was 39 years with the youngest being 16 and the oldest 64. The age profile is representative of that of Shanghai, with the average age of the working population in Shanghai in 2003 being 39.7 years. 9 In the district 53 per cent of those participating in the 25 plus X scheme were male. At the end of 2004 56.5% of the working aged population in the district were male, while the corresponding figure for Shanghai as a whole was 61.2%. 10 Overall 83 per cent of employees enrolled in the 25 plus X scheme in the district had a junior middle school level education or less. The comparable figures for the district and Shanghai as a whole at the end of 2004 were 50 per cent and 45.1 per cent respectively. 11 Thus, individuals covered under the 25 plus X scheme have lower levels of education than people living in the district as a whole or for Shanghai as a whole. This result is expected as most of the participants in the 25 plus X scheme are former farmers who could be expected to have low levels of education relative to those in urban areas, while the district contains both urban and rural pockets. The average length that an individual had been with their current employer was just under three years with a minimum of zero, meaning the individual had just joined the firm, and a maximum of over 36 years. The variables PriorScheme_LandGroup1, PriorScheme_LandGroup2 and PriorScheme_LandGroup3 interact the social insurance status of participants in the 25 plus X scheme prior to joining the scheme with whether they exchanged land for participating in the scheme. The variable X1 denotes whether the employee received voluntary employer funded commercial pension insurance. Note that only 3.7 per cent of those in the scheme in the district received voluntary employer funded commercial pension insurance, suggesting that firms made such contributions sparingly. In the next section we examine whether the characteristics of employees can be used to predict who received voluntary employer-funded commercial pension insurance. A dummy variable where 1 = individual was previously were under the rural social security scheme or had no insurance, and forfeited land in exchange for participating in 25 plus X, 0 otherwise 58.45% previously were under the rural social security scheme or had no insurance, and forfeited land in exchange for participating in 25 plus X PriorScheme_Land Group 2 A dummy variable where 1 = individual previously had urban insurance and did not exchange land for participating in 25 plus X, 0 otherwise 4.84% previously had urban insurance and did not exchange land for participating in 25 plus X PriorScheme_Land Group 3 A dummy variable where 1 = individual previously had urban insurance, and forfeited land in exchange for participating in 25 plus X, 0 otherwise 36.71% previously had urban insurance, and forfeited land in exchange for participating in 25 plus X 9
Who Gets Commercial Pension Insurance?
In this section we model whether an employee receives employer-funded commercial pension insurance (X1) as a function of age (Age, Age 2 ), education (Education), length of employment (Employment), education interacted with length of employment (Education X Employment) and the social insurance status of the individual prior to joining the 25 plus X scheme interacted with whether the individual forfeited land in exchange for participation in the scheme (PriorScheme_Land). This relationship can be expressed as follows (where ε is the error term reflecting unobserved random factors):
, Education, Employment, Education X Employment, PriorScheme_Land, ε) (1) Given that the dependent variable (X1) is a binary variable, normally it would be appropriate to use a logit model. However, only 3.7 per cent of employees received employer-funded commercial pension insurance. Thus, the sample used to analyze voluntary employer contributions to social insurance is skewed with a high proportion of 'zeros'. King and Zeng (2001) pointed out that where the distribution is heavily skewed the method of computing probabilities of what they term 'rare events' in logit analysis is suboptimal in finite samples, leading to errors in the same direction as biases in the coefficients. To address the problems caused by a skewed distribution, we present bias-corrected logit coefficients that are calculated using the ReLogit model Previous research has suggested that employers may adopt different human resource practices depending on the demographic and human capital characteristics of the workforce. Goodstein (1994) proposed that employees represent constituencies exerting differing degrees of institutional pressure on their employees and eliciting strategic responses of compliance or resistance relative to the power of the constituency and the organization's dependence on them. Blum et al. (1996) extended the distinction between core and peripheral economic sectors proposed by Beck et al., (1978) to denote the demographic characteristics of organizations and the human resources practices that they employ. According to Blum et al. (1996) organizations in the core economic sector possess market power and have jobs requiring a higher level of skill than those in the peripheral sector, while peripheral firms typically operate in a much more competitive environment and generally employ from what has been termed the secondary labor market, requiring labor that is simple, menial, repetitive and interchangeable. In contrast to the more highly educated workforce that exist in the core economic sector, the highly interchangeable workforce that make up the peripheral economic sector represent a constituency with little control over their employers' labor resources. Blum et al. (1996) argued that while core firms have a high proportion of male workers, peripheral firms employ a high proportion of females who have little bargaining power in negotiating benefits and, as such, employers are better placed to resist their demands. Following the founding of the People's Republic, female labor force participation in China increased to a high of 90 per cent, with women exhibiting a strong sense of entitlement to good jobs (Hughes & Maurer-Fazio, 2002) . However, contrary to the Communist Party rhetoric that women 'hold up half the sky' one effect of market reforms in China has been to allow managers to engage in discriminatory practices, with a resultant decline in female earnings and status towards their pre-Revolutionary levels. There is evidence that in China female employees have little bargaining power in the workplace with several studies having documented gender discrimination in wages, with the wage differential being larger in the non-state sector than the state-owned sector and in the eastern seaboard provinces relative to the interior provinces (Liu et al., 2000; Hughes & Maurer-Fazio, 2002; Maurer-Fazio et al., 1999) . Other studies have found evidence of gender discrimination in the provision of employer social insurance contributions to social insurance schemes with employers less likely to make mandated social insurance contributions for females than males (Nielsen et al., 2005b) .
H1: Males will be more likely than females to receive commercial pension insurance. Blum et al. (1996) argued that unlike employers with a high proportion of female employees, those employing a high proportion of better educated workers are generally representative of firms in the economic core. These employees require some measure of skills and training relative to those in the peripheral economic sector. Better educated workers are likely to be in higher demand and therefore more susceptible to poaching from competitors. From this perspective, better educated workers represent relatively more influential constituencies with some measure of control over their employers' labor resources (Goodstein, 1994) . Firms are more likely to make voluntary social insurance contributions for such employees as a labor retention strategy. Profit maximizing firms also have an incentive to get such workers to invest in firm-specific skills to reduce the threat of poaching. As discussed earlier, scholars of societal corporatism emphasize that in order to get employees to invest in firm-specific skills it is in the interest of profit maximizing firms to provide social insurance to insulate workers against shocks and mitigate the reluctance of employees to make such investments.
H2:
The better educated will be more likely to receive commercial pension insurance. Blum et al. (1996) also argued that older employees will be better represented in the economic core and that older employees will represent a more substantial investment for the firm in terms of the skills they bring to the job relative to younger employees. For this reason, from the perspectives of both institutional pressure and organizational self-interest Blum et al. (1996) argued that older employees will be better placed to demand more benefits such as commercial pension insurance designed to retain their services. However, it has been shown that older employees are more likely to be committed to the firm, which is attributed to their higher level of job satisfaction than younger employees and/or having cognitively justified remaining with the organization (Meyer & Allen, 1984) . To the extent that older employees have higher job satisfaction and commitment to the firm, there is less need for employers to engage labor retention practices such as voluntary employer funded social contributions. This sets up two competing hypotheses:
H3a: Older employees will be more likely to receive commercial pension insurance H3b: Older employees will be less likely to receive commercial pension insurance Similar competing hypotheses exist with respect to the period which an employee has been with the firm. On the one hand, it has been shown that the length of time an employee has been with the firm breeds familiarity, mutual understanding and employee identification with the firm (Edwards, 1979) . To the extent that longer serving employees have higher commitment to the firm, there is less need to utilize labor retention strategies. However, on the other hand, there are two considerations suggesting that longer serving employees may be more likely to receive the X1 component. First, research suggests that human capital may increase from work experience as well as from formal education (Judge et al., 1995) . As longer serving employees build up human capital, profit maximizing firms will have an incentive to use labor retention strategies such as employer-funded social insurance contributions to retain their services. Therefore, longer serving employees being more likely to receive X1 would be consistent with employers rewarding substantial firm-specific skill acquisition amongst employees. Second, in the planning era in China, while the compensation system adjusted for schooling attainments, wage levels depended primarily on seniority reflected in years of service to the firm. Even in the market reform period state enterprises have lacked the incentive to train their workers, but seniority in the firm has been rewarded. Thus, independent of any human capital effect, it may be that employees with longer service to the firm are more likely to be rewarded with commercial pension insurance as an extension of administratively-based seniority scales (Knight & Yueh, 2004) .
H4a: Longer serving employees will be more likely to receive commercial pension insurance.
H4b: Longer serving employees will be less likely to receive commercial pension insurance.
Next, we interact length of employment with formal education. Zhang et al. (2005) showed that when returns to schooling are considered by different experience cohorts in urban China over the period 1988 to 2001, the returns are higher for new market entrants. In other words, the longer one has been out of school, the lower are the returns to education. One explanation for this finding could be that employees with less work experience are more mobile because they have made fewer firm-specific investments. Another explanation could be a vintage effect reflected in the rising quality of education in urban China over time. That the quality of education has increased during the market reform period is well-documented (see eg. Zhang et al., 2005) Given that the quality of education has increased over time, we expect that for a given level of education, newer market entrants will be more valuable to employers and, thus, in Goodstein's (1994) framework, newer market entrants will be relatively more influential constituencies.
H5: Length of employment will interact with formal education negatively on the probability of an employee receiving commercial pension insurance.
In terms of the prior social insurance status of those participating in the 25 plus X scheme, we expect that those who previously had urban insurance would be more likely to receive commercial pension insurance than those who previously had rural social security coverage or no coverage at all. The reason is that prior to the introduction of 25 plus X many firms had voluntarily offered their employees coverage provided under the urban insurance scheme rather than just providing coverage under the rural social security scheme. This suggests that these employees had skills that the firm considered important to retain. While a number of firms have taken the opportunity since the introduction of 25 plus X to reduce their contribution from 37 per cent (under the urban insurance scheme) to 28 per cent (the 25 per cent base rate plus X2 for medical insurance) for these employees who were previously covered under the urban scheme, it is reasonable to expect that some of the difference in employer contributions between the two schemes would be reduced through employer funded commercial pension insurance.
When comparing those who forfeited land rights in exchange for participation in the 25 plus X scheme and those that did not, there are no obvious differences in the human capital that the two groups would bring to employers. However, there are two considerations suggesting that employers may be more likely to contribute to commercial pension insurance for employees who forfeited their land in exchange for participating in the scheme compared with those who did not. The first is that the 25 per cent base amount is guaranteed for employees who exchanged their land for 15 years irrespective of whether they change jobs. The second is that employees who forfeited their land in exchange for participating in the scheme also received an urban hukou. An urban hukou increases their job mobility by giving them the right, if they so choose, to work for an enterprise in downturn Shanghai where wages are potentially higher. Both of these factors suggest that employers may be more likely to contribute to commercial pension insurance in order to encourage this group of employees to remain with the firm.
H6: Employees who previously had urban insurance and who forfeited land in exchange for
participation in the 25 plus X scheme will be more likely to receive commercial pension insurance relative to employees who previously had urban insurance but did not forfeit land in exchange for participation in the 25 plus X scheme and employees who previously were covered by rural social security or had no coverage at all. 
Notes:
The reference category for education is those with a four year higher education and above. The reference category for the interaction variable between education and length of employment is (Four_higher) × (Employment). The reference category for the variable interacting the social insurance status of participants with whether they traded land to participate in the 25 plus X scheme is PriorScheme_Land3. *(**)(***) denotes that the coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 10(5)(1) per cent level of significance. The t-values are reported in brackets.
The results of the ReLogit model predicting whether employees receive X1 are presented in Table  2 . There is support for H2. Relative to those with a four year higher education degree or above (the reference category), those whose highest education was a three year higher degree, polytechnic school, senior middle school or junior middle school were statistically less likely to receive the X1 component. The odds ratios indicated that those with a junior middle education or three year higher degree were just under half (.452 & .485 ) as likely to receive X1, while those with a senior middle or polytechnic education were about one-third (.357 & .301) as likely to receive X1.
There is support for H4a: employees who have been with the firm longer are more likely to receive an X1 component. The odds ratio indicated that while statistically significant, the effect size for tenure was not large, with those employees who have been with the firm longer only 1.007 times more likely to receive an X1 component. The other hypothesis that is supported is H6. Relative to employees who previously had urban insurance and who forfeited land in exchange for participation in the 25 plus X scheme (the reference category), employees who previously had urban insurance but did not forfeit land in exchange for participation in the 25 plus X scheme and employees who previously were covered by rural social security or had no coverage at all, were statistically less likely to receive an X1 component. Odds ratios for these parameters indicated that employees who previously had urban insurance but did not forfeit land in exchange for participation in the 25 plus X scheme were about 20% (.166) as likely to receive X as employees who previously had urban insurance and who forfeited land in exchange for participation in the 25 plus X scheme. Employees who previously were covered by rural social security or had no coverage at all were three-and-a-half per-cent (.034) as likely to receive X as employees who previously had urban insurance and who forfeited land in exchange for participation in the 25 plus X scheme. There is no support for the effects of gender (H1) or age (H3) on who receives X1. There is also no support for H5: Education interacted with the experience variable was statistically insignificant.
Overall the results suggest that human capital in the form of formal education is the most important of the personal characteristics that determine which employees receive X1. Banister (2005) showed that firms in urban China are increasingly designing compensation packages that take into account monetary and non-monetary rewards. This suggests one would expect a positive correlation between monetary returns and fringe benefits such as commercial pension insurance. In this respect, the results for education in this study are consistent with studies of the monetary returns to education that have employed recent data. Studies of the returns to schooling in urban China that employed data from the 1980s and 1990s found low returns, with one year of schooling increasing earnings by 1-3 per cent (Byron & Manaloto, 1990; Meng & Kidd, 1997) . However, studies that have employed more recent data have found that returns to investment to education have increased in urban China (Heckman & Li, 2004; Maurer-Fazio & Dinh, 2004; Zhang et al. 2005) . For instance, Heckman and Li (2004) found that the return to education of an additional year of schooling was 7 per cent in 2000, while Zhang et al., (2005) found that the returns to an additional year of schooling increased from 4 per cent in 1988 to more than 10 per cent in 2001. Also supporting our findings that employers have a higher probability of contributing to commercial pension insurance to retain higher educated staff is evidence that the better educated are more mobile in the labor market. As early as 1995, findings from the Chinese Household Income Project indicated that that those who were better educated were more mobile than the less well-educated who tended to remain with the one employer (Li & Zax, 2002, pp. 14-15) .
The support for H6 reinforces the findings that employers are more likely to contribute to commercial pension insurance for those with higher levels of education to the extent that those who were previously receiving coverage under the urban scheme are likely to have skills that the firms wants to retain relative to employees who previously had either rural social security coverage or no coverage at all. While many firms who had voluntarily provided coverage under the urban scheme have decided to switch to the lower contribution required by the 25 plus X scheme, the results indicate they are statistically more likely to pay X1 for those who previously had the higher coverage. The support for H6 also confirms the expectation that employers are statistically more likely to contribute X1 for farmers who exchanged land for participation in the 25 plus X scheme and an urban hukou, reflecting their higher prospective job mobility compared to those who do not have an urban hukou. In the framework proposed by Goodstein (1994) , farmers who exchanged their land can be considered to represent more influential constituencies.
CONCLUSION
Social protection is a topic that has received little attention from HRM scholars, despite the cost that it represents to many firms and its potential value as a labor retention strategy. Traditional accounts of the rise of social institutions have portrayed a tension between the accepted need to fund social protection for employees against the vagaries of the market and resistance at the firm level to the notion that the state is unduly shifting the funding burden on to them. Recently, this account has been challenged by 'revisionist' depictions of` the social policy preferences of firms that argue there are circumstances where firms will willingly contribute to social insurance for employees as a means to encourage an otherwise reluctant workforce to invest in firm-specific skills.
This paper has drawn on a unique dataset containing information on the entire population participating in Shanghai's 25 plus X scheme in one district to examine the factors which predict which employees receive voluntary social insurance contributions. It was hypothesized that employees with characteristics that made them more influential constituencies would be more likely to receive voluntary social insurance contributions. The first main conclusion that emerges from the study is that only a small proportion of employers -less than 4 per cent -make voluntary social insurance contributions. A proviso to this finding is that the data used in this study reflected the state of play in 2004, soon after the introduction of the 25 plus X scheme and employers and employees need time to gradually familiarize themselves with the role of X1. Thus, it may be that the proportion of employees receiving X1 increases in the future. A second main conclusion is that education is an important determinant of whether an employee received commercial pension insurance. While we did not have data on the skill composition of employees, to the extent that formal education is a good proxy for skills, this finding supports the societal corporatist perspective that it is likely that employers who have invested significant resources in the skills of their workers will favor social policies that allow them to target benefits to a select group of workers and reward their performance.
